Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Beyond the Left: Lulaism and the Brasília Consensus Win

                      Beyond the Left: Lulaism and the Brasília Consensus Win

During his presidential campaign in 2002, Lula was passing by an expensive school in a wealthy neighbourhood of Sao Paulo. A boy from the school spotted him and shouted, “Vote for Lula! Vote for Lula!”

This surprised Lula and his entourage. Lula approached the boy, thanked him for his support and asked, “You must be from a rich family to afford this expensive school. How come you support a leftist candidate like me?”

The boy replied seriously, “Senhor Lula, you are right. My father is a big businessman. He says that if you become President, you will ruin his business and the country. In that case, he says we will move to Miami. I love Miami. So I pray every night that you will win.”

Lula went on to win the presidential elections in 2002, 2006, 2022 and, most recently, on 25 October 2026. He did not ruin the country as the boy's father had feared. On the contrary, during his presidency, he became a darling of many Brazilian businessmen. Besides promoting business within Brazil, Lula actively championed Brazilian companies abroad. He took business delegations on his foreign visits, lobbied with foreign governments and helped Brazilian companies secure contracts and projects in Latin America, Africa and other regions. Even after leaving the presidency in 2010, he continued promoting Brazilian business interests abroad.

Lulaism and Brasilia Consensus

Lula is not a typical leftist ideologue with an aversion to capitalists. He is a pragmatic and visionary leader. He has a firm conviction that Brazil needs a strong and flourishing private sector to create jobs and generate wealth. He believes that a prosperous private sector would generate higher tax revenues to finance his pro-poor policies. He has, therefore, pursued a judicious blend of business-friendly and pro-poor policies. Lula is like a violinist, holding the poor with his left hand and playing the rich with his right hand. This is the essence of Lulaism and what can be broadly described as the Brasília Consensus. It is a sensible and necessary formula for a country with a large population of poor people and one of the world's highest levels of income inequality.

The Brasília Consensus offers a pragmatic alternative to the neoliberal orthodoxy associated with the Washington Consensus. The debt crisis of the 1980s and the austerity and structural adjustment programmes imposed on Latin America resulted in economic stagnation and cuts in expenditure on social welfare, healthcare and education. The 1980s came to be known in the economic history of Latin America as the Lost Decade. 

During Lula's first two presidential terms, about 30 million Brazilians were lifted out of poverty. Economic growth, employment generation, increases in the minimum wage and social welfare programmes enabled millions of Brazilians to enter the consumer market. The poor gained purchasing power while businesses gained millions of new customers. The two complemented each other in a virtuous cycle of growth and redistribution. The businessmen of Sao Paulo did not have to migrate to Miami. They stayed in Brazil and made more money from the expanding economy.

Lula completed his second presidential term in December 2010 with exceptionally high approval ratings. He then successfully promoted Dilma Rousseff, an experienced technocrat  as his successor, although she lacked charisma and political skills. She won the presidential elections in 2010 and 2014, riding largely on the Lula factor and the legacy of Lulaism.

Lulaism versus Chavismo

The success of Lulaism contrasted sharply with the radical Twenty-First Century Socialism promoted by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.

Chávez, like Lula, started his presidency as a champion of the poor. But he turned against the private sector after the coup in which he was overthrown in April 2002. The coup was supported by the private sector business. A businessman who was head of the country’s apex chamber of commerce and industry Pedro Carmona took over as interim president. Chavez was put in a jail in a remote island to be sent on exile to Cuba. But the coupsters messed up and refused to share power with the anti-Chavez generals who helped with the coup. This caused anger and frustration among the anti-Chavez camp which let the Chavista generals to bring Chavez back to the presidential palace from the jail. Thereafter, Chavez started punishing the private sector oligarchy ruthlessly and systematically. These punitive measures and mismanagement of the economy combined with the crippling and illegal US sanctions ruined Venezuela’s economy and democracy. This gave the Latin American Right a convenient political bogeyman. Conservative candidates warned voters that electing the Left would turn their countries into another Venezuela.

But Lula offered a counterexample.

During the presidential campaigns in Uruguay and Peru, conservative candidates invoked the Venezuelan experience to frighten voters away from the Left. José Mujica in Uruguay and Ollanta Humala in Peru sought to reassure voters by presenting themselves as followers of Lula's pragmatic model rather than Chávez's radical experiment. Mujica won in 2009 and Humala in 2011. 

The 2026 election: More than a personal victory for Lula

The outcome of Brazil's presidential election on 25 October 2026 is not merely Lula's personal political triumph. It is a clear message to the far-right extremist Bolsonaros and his kind in Latin America who want to take the region back to the era of caudillos. 

If Flavio Bolsonaro had won, he would have caused serious damage to the democracy of the country, going beyond the harm already done by his father Jair Bolsonaro. The latter has a long history of toxic antidemocratic and pro-military rhetoric and actions. These include his coup attempt after he lost the elections in 2022;  campaigns of false accusations against the election system and his open admiration for the past military dictatorship in Brazil and other South American countries. During his presidential visit to Chile, he praised Pinochet dictatorship, causing embarrassment to his Chilean hosts. “Elections won’t change anything in this country”, an angry Bolsonaro told an interviewer on the programme Câmara Aberta, broadcast by TV Band in 1999. “It will only change on the day that we break out in civil war here and do the job that the military regime didn’t do, killing 30,000 people. If we kill some innocent people that’s fine because in every war innocent people die.” Shouting at the interviewer, an intemperate Bolsonaro said that if he became president he would dissolve Congress on his first day in office. Bolsonaro had dedicated his vote for impeachment of President Dilma Rouseff to the notorious Colonel Ustra who tortured her when she was caught as a young leftwing guerilla fighter. He called Ustra as a national hero. As president, he had not only militarized the government but had also politicised the armed forces. The Bolsonarist mobs had camped several times in front of the army headquarters in Brasilia and called for the return of military dictatorship and closure of the Congress and Supreme Court while President Bolsonaro smiled and cheered the crowds. 

As president, Bolsonaro had  spoiled the good image assiduously built over the years by the professional Brazilian diplomats. He had shocked the world with his bigotry on global environmental concerns. 

His son Eduardo Bolsonaro, who was a member of the Congress had once ( 9 July 2018)  threatened, “If you want to shut down the Supreme Federal Court, you don't even need to send a jeep. Just send a soldier and a corporal.”  After winning the first round, Flavio Bolsonaro announced his plan to redemocratise the country which was a signal of his intention to revive and build on the authoritarian project of his brother and father. 

These actions and statements of Bolsonaros have made them clearly and distinctly as the most toxic and dangerous for democracy among the far-right extremist leaders in Latin America. The defeat of Flavio Bolsonaro is therefore more important than the victory of Lula for the democracy of Brazil.

The rise of the Brazilian Right

The Bolsonaros did not create the conservative movement in Brazil. They capitalised on its expansion and rode on the powerful wave of the three conservative constituencies which had already emerged around the three Bs: Bible, Beef and Bullet.

The Bible represents the growing political influence of evangelical churches. The number of evangelicals has steadily risen and is now close to a third of the country’s population.  Many evangelical leaders have mobilised their followers around conservative positions on abortion, sexuality and family values.

The Beef constituency represents agribusiness, cattle ranchers and agricultural exporters. Brazil's emergence as an agricultural superpower has given this sector enormous economic and political influence. Many agribusiness leaders oppose environmental restrictions and land-use regulations that they consider obstacles to production and investment.

The Bullet constituency represents advocates of tougher policing, expanded gun rights and stronger security policies, including supporters with military and police backgrounds.

Together, these constituencies have built a powerful presence in the Brazilian Congress. Their influence extends well beyond Bolsonaro's personal political following.

The conservative movement received a boost from the corruption scandals that discredited the Workers' Party (PT). The Lava Jato, or Car Wash, investigations exposed extensive corruption involving Petrobras, construction companies and politicians from several parties. Dilma Rousseff was impeached in August 2016. Lula was imprisoned in April 2018. The PT suffered a severe loss of credibility. This created a perfect opportunity for the right. But at this opportune time, several established moderate political leaders, including Michel Temer and Aecio Neves, were themselves damaged by corruption allegations and investigations. Jair Bolsonaro exploited this political vacuum and hijacked the conservative movement in the 2018 elections.

Brazil needs a credible centre-right alternative to the leftist PT

After the long political dominance of Lula and the Workers' Party, Brazil has a legitimate need for a credible alternative. By the time of the 2026 election, Lula had already served twelve years as President. At the age of 80 during the campaign, he faced the challenge of connecting with a new generation shaped by influencers, social media, digital communication and changing economic aspirations. The PT has also struggled to recover fully from its earlier corruption scandals and the political setbacks of the past decade.

Lula's personal recovery from the setbacks did not repeat in the case of the Workers' Party. Many veterans of the party suffered defeat in the elections. The 2026 congressional elections demonstrated the continuing strength of the conservatives. Bolsonaro's Liberal Party has emerged with substantial representation in both houses of Congress as well as governorships of more states. 

An opportunity for the moderate centre-right

Flavio Bolsonaro's cowardly escape from Brazil to the US after his election defeat has hit the credibility of the extremist Bolsonaros. This has given an opportunity for the emergence of moderate centre-right leaders like Tarcisio de Freitas, the pragmatic governor of Sao Paulo. He was re-elected as governor of São Paulo in the first round on 4 October 2026, winning an impressive 62.65% of the votes against Fernando Haddad, a top leader of the PT.  Tarcísio has cultivated an image of administrative competence, infrastructure development and business-friendly governance. His electoral success in Brazil's largest and richest state gives him considerable political weight.

Impact on Latin America

What Latin America needs is a healthy political competition in which both the Left and the Right respect democratic institutions, accept electoral outcomes and offer credible alternatives for economic and social development. Uruguay provides an instructive example. Its leftist Frente Amplio and centre-right parties have alternated in power while respecting constitutional institutions and the country's admirable tradition of political moderation. Presidents and former presidents of Uruguay maintain cordial relations and even undertake foreign tours together, rising above partisan differences in the larger national interest. Chile, too, has experienced an alternation of power between moderate and pragmatic governments of the Left and the Right over the past three decades.

Given the widespread poverty, persistent marginalisation of indigenous communities and glaring income inequalities in Latin America, Lulaism and the Brasília Consensus, with their pragmatic blend of pro-poor and business-friendly policies, offer the most promising way forward for inclusive growth, democratic stability and shared prosperity.

Resistance to Donroe Doctrine

On the external front, Latin America needs to stand up to the US, whose new ‘Donroe Doctrine’ threatens to push the region back to the bad old days of political and economic instability. Unfortunately, some of the pro-US right-wing presidents and political leaders of the region have become willing collaborators or passive accomplices in the American interventionist agenda. The abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the US assertion of control over Venezuela’s oil business, the militarisation of the war on drugs, the indiscriminate bombing of suspected drug-trafficking boats in the waters around Latin America, and the threats and sanctions crippling Cuba are recent examples of the impunity with which Washington is prepared to intervene in and destabilise the region.

The Bolsonaros have been openly inviting American intervention to subvert the democracy of Brazil and help them to come to power. During his 2019 visit to US, he tweeted, “For the first time in a while, a pro-America Brazilian president arrives in DC.” He had made an unusual  visit to the CIA headquarters. This was bizarre. No foreign president goes to CIA office. According to diplomatic protocol, it should have been the CIA Director who should have called on him and not the other way. After the visit, Eduardo Bolsonaro described the CIA as “one of the most respected intelligence agencies in the world,” in a tweet.

The election of Lula has enabled Brazil to resist the American interventionism. President Lula has a history of standing up against US intervention in Latin America. Fortunately, Mexico, Latin America’s second-largest economy, led by another leftist president, Claudia Sheinbaum, has also been resisting American interventionism in its own way. Unlike Mexico, however, Brazil is much less dependent on the US for trade and investment, giving it greater room for strategic manoeuvre. Brazil exports more to China than to the US and the European Union combined. It is also the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Latin America. In a symbolic shift, the Chinese automobile giant BYD has taken over the factory abandoned by Ford in Brazil. Where the Americans have retreated with their old twentieth century technology, the Chinese are advancing, ushering in the twenty first century electric vehicle revolution.

It was Lula who, in the first decade of this century, played a leading role in bringing Latin America together through regional initiatives such as UNASUR and CELAC, building the collective strength of the region to counter US domination. When Washington sought to impose its own vision of hemispheric integration through the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the three leftist presidents — Lula, Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez — took the lead in burying the American project at the Mar del Plata Summit in 2005. In contrast, many of the right-wing presidents of Latin America have tended to undermine regional integration and align themselves with the interventionist policies of Washington, weakening the collective bargaining power and strategic autonomy of the region.



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