Sunday, July 05, 2026

Keiko Fujimori's victory: Peru's best chance for political stability

 Keiko Fujimori's victory: Peru's best chance for political stability


Peru has endured one of the most turbulent political periods in Latin America over the past decade. Since 2016, the country has had six presidents. Four former presidents have either been impeached, removed from office or forced to resign, while three have spent time in jail.
Against this backdrop, the election of Keiko Fujimori offers Peru its strongest opportunity in years to restore political stability.


Unlike her immediate predecessors, Fujimori is a seasoned political insider. She has spent nearly two decades at the centre of Peruvian politics and understands the complex relationship between the presidency, Congress and Lima's political establishment. This stands in sharp contrast to Pedro Castillo, the left-wing rural schoolteacher who unexpectedly won the presidency in 2021. Castillo entered office with little political experience and struggled to manage Congress or build alliances within the political establishment. Surrounded by poor advisers, he made a series of disastrous political decisions that culminated in his impeachment and arrest. Such political missteps are far less likely in Fujimori's case. She knows the rules of Peru's political game and has often been one of its principal players.

Ironically, however, her own party, Fuerza Popular, bears considerable responsibility for the very political instability that has plagued Peru. Although Fujimori narrowly lost the presidential elections in 2011, 2016 and 2021, her party remained the largest force in Congress throughout those years. It repeatedly used its parliamentary strength to weaken governments that lacked legislative majorities, contributing to the collapse of successive administrations. Had Fujimori lost once again, Peru might well have faced another cycle of confrontation and instability.

Fujimori has learnt important lessons from her three presidential defeats. She is acutely aware that her latest victory was hard fought and achieved by the narrowest of margins. Although she finished first in the opening round of this year's election, she secured only 17 percent of the vote, underscoring the fragmented nature of Peruvian politics. Such a limited electoral mandate is likely to encourage pragmatism, coalition-building and moderation rather than ideological confrontation.

She has also learnt hard lessons from the dramatic rise and equally dramatic fall of her father, Alberto Fujimori. His presidency restored macroeconomic stability and defeated the Shining Path insurgency, but it ultimately collapsed under the weight of authoritarianism and corruption. Having witnessed both the achievements and failures of that era at close quarters, Keiko Fujimori is likely to adopt a more mature  and institutionally cautious style of governance.

Her political position is considerably stronger than that of most recent presidents. In the congressional elections held alongside the presidential poll, Fuerza Popular emerged as the largest party in both chambers. It won 22 of the 60 seats in the Senate and 43 of the 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Although short of an outright majority, these numbers place Fujimori in a strong position to build legislative coalitions with other centre-right and centrist parties.

These political advantages give her a better chance than any recent Peruvian president of completing a full five-year term. If she succeeds, Peru could finally regain the political stability that has eluded it for much of the past decade.

One of her most pressing challenges will be tackling the surge in crime and violence. Drug trafficking organisations and criminal gangs have expanded their influence during years of political uncertainty and weak governance. Restoring public security will be among the first and most important tests of her administration.

Ironically, while Peru's politics has been highly unstable, its economy has remained one of Latin America's strongest performers. Despite repeated political crises, the economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, consistently outperforming its political system. Sound macroeconomic management has kept inflation below three percent, public debt at around 33 percent of GDP—low by Latin American standards—and international reserves at comfortable levels.

The country's independent central bank has been a pillar of stability under Julio Velarde, who has served as governor since 2006. Remarkably, he has outlasted ten Peruvian presidents and has been reappointed by governments of both the Left and the Right. His continuity has provided an institutional anchor rarely seen elsewhere in the region.

Peru has retained its investment-grade credit rating despite prolonged political turmoil. The economy grew by 3.4 percent in 2025, driven by robust mining exports and favourable international prices for copper and other minerals. Peru is the world's third-largest producer of copper and a major producer of gold, silver, zinc and molybdenum. Mining contributes around 10–15 percent of GDP, generates about 60 percent of export earnings and accounts for a significant share of government revenue.

Some Western commentators, including The Economist, have interpreted Keiko Fujimori's victory as part of a broader "Trumpification" of Latin America. This is simplistic and misleading. The comparison overlooks the distinct domestic factors behind Fujimori's victory as well as those of  other right wing leaders in Latin America in recent years. Fujimori has neither cultivated close political ties with Donald Trump nor sought to emulate his confrontational style of politics. Her election was driven exclusively by Peru's internal political dynamics.

More importantly, Peru's political environment leaves little room for Trumpian extremism. Governments that ignore the concerns of poorer rural populations have repeatedly faced mass protests and political upheaval. Fujimori is therefore more likely to govern pragmatically than ideologically, balancing market-oriented economic policies with the political necessity of maintaining social stability.

The addition of political stability under Presidency of Fujimori to the already strong economic fundamentals means that Peru could enter a new phase of higher economic growth and prosperity.

That would also benefit India, whose economic relationship with Peru has expanded rapidly. India's exports to Peru reached US$1.15 billion in 2025–26, with considerable potential for further growth. Peru's exports to India amounted to US$8.87 billion, led by gold (US$8 billion) and copper (US$730 million). Bilateral trade reached US$10.02 billion, making Peru India's second-largest trading partner in Latin America after Brazil. India has also emerged as Peru's third-largest export destination globally, after China and the United States.

Yet India's trade policy has not kept pace with the growing importance of Peru. India's exports to Peru, at US$1.15 billion, are more than double its exports to New Zealand (US$567 million), while total bilateral trade with Peru (US$10.02 billion) is nearly nine times larger than that with New Zealand (US$1.16 billion). Despite this, India concluded a Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand through rapid conclusion of negotiations in 2025–26, while negotiations for the India–Peru Trade Agreement, which began in 2017, are still dragging on despite nine rounds of talks. On 5 July 2026, India's Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, remarked that the agreement was "unlikely to conclude soon.” It is a pity. Given the scale of bilateral trade and potential, the India-Peru FTA deserves far greater attention and urgency.

Saturday, July 04, 2026

“Undiscovered” - novel by Peruvian writer Gabriela Wiener

Discovered a new Peruvian writer Gabriela Wiener through her novel Undiscovered

The story is about her own surname, Wiener, inherited from her ancestor, the Austrian-French explorer and ethnographer Charles Wiener, whose life and legacy form the novel's central thread.



Charles Wiener was among the earliest European explorers to introduce Peru to French audiences, carrying home a trove of Indigenous Peruvian artefacts that now reside in museums in Paris. Yet his reputation is clouded by embellished accounts and dubious claims about his expeditions, raising unsettling questions about how colonial history was written.

Standing before these artefacts in a Paris museum, Gabriela Wiener embarks on an excavation of her own life. Descended from both the colonizer and the colonized, she confronts the contradictions of her identity as a woman with Indigenous ancestry who is often looked down upon by whites and even by lighter-skinned mestizos.

With courageous candour and honesty, Wiener interweaves history with autobiography, exploring racism, desire, love, infidelity and family through the lens of her own polyamorous relationships. The result is an intensely personal yet profoundly sociopolitical novel

Friday, May 29, 2026

Latin America: India's Most Undervalued Export Market

 Latin America: India's Most Undervalued Export Market

India’s exports to Latin American countries now exceed exports to several neighboring markets and traditional trade partners, underscoring the region’s emergence as a strategically important destination for Indian goods.

In 2025–26, India’s exports to Brazil reached 7.02 billion dollars—higher than exports to Japan (6.04 bn), Vietnam (6.6 bn), Spain (6.96 bn), South Korea (6.01 bn), South Africa (7 bn), and Malaysia (6.82 bn).

Exports to Mexico totaled 5.73 billion dollars, exceeding exports to Sri Lanka (5.52 bn), Thailand (5.06 bn), Indonesia (4.49 bn), Russia (4.49 bn), Canada (4.67 bn), Egypt (3.93 bn), and Turkey (4.54 bn).

Exports to Chile reached 1.22 bn, exceeding exports to neighboring Myanmar at 808 m.

Exports to Guatemala at 656 m were more than the exports of 567 m to New Zealand.

Exports to the Dominican Republic totaled 411 m, which were higher than the exports to Cambodia at 280 m. Dom Republic has a population of about 11.5 million, compared with Cambodia’s 18 million.

Exports to Honduras totaled 257 m, exceeding exports to Kazakhstan at 185 m, despite Honduras having roughly half Kazakhstan’s population.

This is not a one-year wonder; it is the continuation of a decade-long trend. Latin America has clearly emerged as an important destination for India’s exports, with significant room for further growth in the coming years.

India’s exports to the 19 Latin American countries were 21.55 billion dollars in 2025-26, doubling from 10 bn in 2015-16.

Exports could scale to 50 billion dollars if Indian exporters and the Commerce Ministry pursue this underexplored market through a systematic, long-term strategy.

Latin America is a large market of 19 countries, 620 million people, 8 trillion dollars of GDP with per capita income of around 12,000 dollars. The region’s total imports in 2025 were 1.75 trillion dollars.


Motorcycles ride the wave of export boom to Latin America

India’s motorcycle exports to Latin America totaled 1.64 billion dollars, accounting for 41% of India’s global motorcycle exports.

Colombia ranked as the top global destination for India’s motorcycle exports in 2025–26, at 578 million dollars.

Mexico ranked second at 320 million dollars.

Other major markets included Brazil (174 m), Guatemala (141 m), Argentina (90 m), Peru (85 m), and Honduras (56 m).

India is the second-largest supplier of motorcycles to Latin America, after China.

Car exports

Car exports to Latin America totaled 2.25 billion dollars, representing 25% of India’s global car exports of 9 billion dollars.

Major destinations were Mexico (1,125 m), Chile (279 m), Peru (251 m), Colombia (150 m), Panama (77 m), Costa Rica (74 m), Guatemala (58 m), Uruguay (52 m), and Ecuador (50 m).


Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical exports totaled 1.6 billion dollars. India was the 5th largest supplier of pharmaceuticals to the region after US, Germany, Switzerland and Ireland. China ranked 11th.

Major destinations for India’s pharmaceutical exports were Brazil (530 million dollars), Mexico (219 m), Chile (179 m), Colombia (112 m), Guatemala (95 m), Venezuela (79 m), Peru (72 m), the Dominican Republic (72 m), Ecuador (37 m), and Honduras (33 m).


Major items of exports of India to Latin America in 2025-26

Vehicles: 5.5 bn
Chemicals: 3.2 bn
Machinery: 3 bn
Pharmaceuticals: 2 bn
Textiles, including apparel, fabrics, and fibre: 1.3 bn
Petroleum products: 1.07 bn
Aluminum products: 560 m
Plastics: 446 m
Rubber products: 469 m
Cotton: 451 m
Ceramic products: 383 m
Iron and steel: 352 m

Indian companies are also doing well in Latin America

Here are two inspiring examples:

UPL, the largest Indian multinational agrochemicals company got 37% of its revenue from Latin America as against 12% from India.
For Financial Year 2025-2626, UPL Limited reported total consolidated revenue of ₹51,839 crore.
Revenue from Latin America was ₹19,358 crore which is three times more than their turnover of ₹6,343 crore in India.

Kalpataru power transmission company of Mumbai has secured around a billion dollars of EPC contracts in Latin America. This includes the single largest contract of 430 million dollars in Chile

In January 2026, Welspun Corp, an Indian steel pipe manufacturer, has won a 203 million dollar contract from Argentina, which is building the infrastructure for exports of shale gas and oil.

 
India's imports from Latin America:

Gold - 14.7 billion dollars
Crude oil 5.7 billion dollars
Vegetable oil (mostly soya oil) 4.8 bn 
Raw sugar 1.24 bn
Copper concentrate   4.6 bn 
Machinery and equipment  1 bn
Iron and steel 514 m
Wood        487 m
Chemicals 485 m
Fresh Fruits and vegetables 467 m
Cotton 405 m
Wood pulp 244 m
Aluminium products 212 m

Raw gold import has doubled to 14.7 bn from 6.8 bn last year. Peru was the top source of gold imports with 7.99 bn (up from 4.6 bn last year) followed by Chile 1.8 bn, Dominican Republic 1.5 bn, Bolivia 1.25 bn,Colombia 808 m,  Argentina 902 m, Brazil 232 m and Mexico 174 m.

Crude oil imports which reached a peak of around 15 billion dollars in 2013-14 has come down drastically due to US sanctions on Venezuela which had supplied 10 bn dollars of crude in 2013-14.
 
Crude oil import sources in 2025-26: Brazil 2.3 bn, Colombia 1.6 bn, Mexico 333 dollars and Venezuela 255 m.

The loosening of US sanctions have reopened India's crude imports from Venezuela in 2026. In May 2026, Venezuela became India's third-largest crude supplier in May, overtaking Saudi Arabia and the United States. Venezuela supplied around 417,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil to India in May, higher than 283,000 bpd in April.

India has ramped up crude imports from Brazil after the disruption of supplies from the gulf due to the Iran war. Brazil became India’s fourth-largest crude supplier, sending around 290,000 b/d in April. India became the #2 destination for Brazilian oil exports in 2006.

Argentina has emerged as a new source of LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) for India in 2026. Argentina shipped 50,000 tonne of LPG to India in the first three months of 2026 after starting with 22,000 tons in 2025. The country has potential to increase the supplies in the coming years. Argentina has the world's second largest shale gas and the 4th largest shale oil reserves. These are being being extracted and exported starting in the last few years.

Latin America is the main source of soy oil imports of India. Argentina is the #1 global supplier with 3.7 billion dollars, followed by Brazil 1.1 bn. 

Brazil is the source of imports of raw sugar which India refines and reexports to other countries.

Chile, the main supplier of copper and other mineral concentrates from the region, supplied 2.4 bn (up from 1.6 bn last year), followed by Brazil- 935 m, Peru 730 m, Mexico- 286 m and Colombia 148 m

Main suppliers of wood from the region:  Brazil 133 m, Uruguay 120 m, Ecuador 90 m and Panama 33 m.

The region has become a regular and reliable supplier of energy, minerals and edible oil helping Indias policy of strategic diversification of sources of imports, besides contributing to India's energy and food security. The region is endowed with abundance of critical minerals and rare earths.

The Latin Americans have started placing greater emphasis on trade with India as they seek to reduce overdependence on China and diversify beyond the more protectionist markets of Europe and the United States.


Trade 2025-26

Figures in millions (except where it is given in billions) of US Dollars

Country
Exports
Imports
Total trade
Brazil
7.02 bn
8.05 bn
15.07 bn
Mexico
5.73 bn
2.1 bn
7.83 bn
Argentina
1.01 bn
4.96 bn
5.97 bn
Peru
1.15 bn
8.87 bn
10.02 bn
Colombia
1.80 bn
2.9 bn
4.7 bn
Chile
1.22 bn
5.03 bn
6.25 bn
Venezuela
210
469
679
Bolivia
56
1.26 bn
1.82 bn
Ecuador
447
127
574
Uruguay 
238
290
528
Paraguay
188
26
214
Guatemala
656
52
708
Dominican Republic
411
1.65 bn
1.76 bn
Panama
311
242
553
Honduras
257
83
340
Costa Rica
250
142
392
El Salvador
184
4
188
Nicaragua
180
6
186
Cuba
19
6
25
 
Total 
 
22.7 bn
 
36.3 bn
 
59 bn



Source: Ministry of Commerce of India



Tuesday, May 26, 2026

The Water War: how Cochabamba defied the Washington Consensus-and won

The Water War: how Cochabamba defied the Washington Consensus-and won


In the year 2000, in a remote Bolivian city most of the world had never heard of, ordinary people did something extraordinary — they took on a multinational corporation, defied their own government, resisted Washington Consensus and won. The Water War of Cochabamba, Bolivia, was not just a local revolt against unaffordable water bills. It was the first crack in the wall of neoliberalism that had been suffocating Latin America for fifteen years, a warning shot heard from Montevideo to Milan, and the opening chapter of a global struggle to reclaim water as a human right.

To understand why it happened, one must first understand what had been done to Latin America by the Washington Consensus.

In the 1980s, many Latin American countries emerged from decades of repressive military dictatorships. The newly elected governments were attempting to consolidate their fragile democracies while watching the military barracks in their rearview mirrors.  At this insecure time of democracies, Washington DC struck Latin America with the imposition of neoliberalism in the form of Washington Consensus. The Latin American countries were forced to open their markets to Wall Street capital, privatize assets of public sector and cut down expenditure on healthcare, education and social welfare policies. These policies inevitably lead to increased poverty and inequality causing what is called as the Lost Decade of the 1980s.

On the twenty- fifth anniversary of the Water War, the book "Echoes of the Water Wars: Legacies of Cochabamba, Bolivia ” was published in 2025. It brings together contributions from Bolivian activists as well as writers and analysts who supported the movement from outside the country. 



Here is the story of the water war: 

In June 1999, the World Bank issued a report on Bolivia that addressed the water situation in Cochabamba. The city and its surrounding region with about a million inhabitants had long faced water shortages for drinking and farming. The World Bank, along with the International Development Bank, had made privatization a condition for loans and recommended that there be “no public subsidies” to offset increases in the price of water services.

In September 1999, the Bolivian government signed a contract with a company “Aguas del Tunari” granting  control of the water resources and distribution in Cochabamba area. Registered in the Cayman Islands, it was a consortium of International Water of US, Abengoa of Spain, and four Bolivian companies. International Water, which held the majority interest in the consortium, was part of the vast holdings of US-based Bechtel Corporation,

In October 1999, the government enacted Law 2029 to regulate water and sanitation. It restricted long-standing traditional communal water practices and removed protections for rural systems based on collective management and local sharing arrangements. 

At that time, only half of Cochabamba’s population was connected to the central water system. Many others obtained water from cooperative water houses built to meet local needs. Yet, Law 2029 declared that, within the territory covered by a privatization contract, such systems were illegal. Only the contracted company could distribute water. The law thus demanded that the autonomous water systems be handed over without reimbursement or compensation for the people who had invested their own labour and resources in building them. The law extended even to wells installed in peoples' own properties. The law also restricted peasants from collecting rain water without official permission. For many critics, this amounted to the privatization of rain itself.  

The forty-year contract awarded to Aguas del Tunari proved even more controversial than Law 2029. It specified that at the end of each year, rates would rise annually in line with the consumer price index in the United States, in effect “dollarizing” water payments. The contract guaranteed the company an average 16 percent rate of return per year on its investment regardless of management performance or service quality. There was a clause in the contract stating that the contract itself superseded all other contracts, laws, and decrees.

Once Aguas del Tunari began operations, it took advantage of its exclusive rights under Law 2029 to assert control over existing water networks. In some cases, household’s water bills skyrocketed as much as 300 percent. A pensioner, or a teacher who made $80 a month, might see a bill jump from $5 to $25 a month. The consortium had been assembled quickly after no other company bid for the privatization contract. Its capital base appeared limited. Many observers concluded that the company intended to finance investment largely through payments collected from Cochabamba’s residents themselves. 


The people of Cochabamba rose in revolt against the commodification of water for the profit of a private company at the expense of the rights of the citizens and traditional local practices. In November 1999, they formed a community organization called as "Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida” (Coordinator for the Defense of Water and Life) with citizens, farmers and workers. Protests began in January 2000 and continued for four months. Demonstrators blocked roads, organized marches, occupied government offices and eventually took over the office of the water company itself. The government responded first with police repression and later with military force. They even resorted to cutting off supply of food and other goods to the city. Ultimately, the popular resistance proved stronger than the government’s resolve, so the latter had no choice but to terminate the private company contract and repeal Law 2029 in April 2000. 

The victorious water activists, along with supporters from Canada, US, India and Brazil, issued the Cochabamba Declaration on 8 December 2000. The Declaration stated that water belongs to the earth and all species; is sacred to life;  and it is a fundamental human right and a public good.

The privatization of water in Cochabamba was not the first  privatization initiative in Bolivia. Nor was Law 2029 the first legal measure designed to facilitate privatization. Both were part of the neoliberal policies pursued since 1985. At the same time, this economic model was not simply an  external imposition. It was also supported by part of the local business oligarchy which wanted to benefit through collaboration with foreign firms. 

Following the Water War, Bolivia entered a new period of resistance to neoliberal policies, particularly through mobilizations led by Indigenous and popular sectors. This broader wave of struggle helped create the conditions for the rise of Evo Morales, who was elected president in 2005. He was Bolivia’s first Indigenous president and the first to be elected in Latin America.


The Bolivian activists also carried their message about water rights of citizens to other countries of Latin America, Europe and even India. They helped inspire the formation of the Inter-American Network for Water Defense and Rights, REDAVI. Subsequently, other networks emerged, such as the European Water Movement, the African Network for Water Justice and KrUHA in Asia (People’s Coalition for the Right to Water”) based in Indonesia. It came up in 2002 during debates over Indonesian water laws influenced by the World Bank. The People’s Forum for Water encompasses all these networks of the world.


The historic Water War of Bolivia became a major point of reference for movements across Latin America and beyond. In Uruguay, a 2004 referendum was approved by  64% of the voters for water rights of citizens. After the constitutional amendment, Uruguay became the first country in the world to constitutionally recognize access to water and sanitation as a fundamental human right. 

In 2010, the United Nations formally recognized access to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right.

In Italy, voters rejected water privatization in a 2011 referendum, in a major popular rebuke to the government of Silvio Berlusconi's neoliberal economic policies. The Italian referendum became one of Europe’s largest anti-privatization mobilizations. 

In Chile, the social uprising that began in 2019 intensified pressure to reform the ultra-neoliberal Water Code of Pinochet regime established in 1981.  The reforms enacted in 2022 gave greater priority to human consumption and environmental protection. 


India witnessed its water-rights movement in 2002 in Plachimada in Palakkad district of Kerala. The villagers complained that the Coca Cola bottling plant established in 1999 extracted massive quantities of ground water which affected the wells of households and water sources of farms. The local panchayat  refused to renew Coca-Cola’s license, arguing that groundwater belonged to the community and that extraction harmed public welfare. The plant was closed in 2004.


The people of Cochabamba who blocked roads and braved soldiers in the high-altitude cold of Bolivia did not just win back their water. They inspired struggles across the Global South against the Washington Consensus and sent a simple message: citizens can win even when their own governments stand  against them.